By Nassar Rusike.
Once again we have a government in Zimbabwe after the announcement to revert to the government of national unity (GNU) by MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai. Just as Mr. Mugabe had predicted the MDC-T is back after getting some assurance from president Zuma of South Africa that SADC will attempt to resolve the outstanding GNU issues within 30 days.
That is really a tall order given the fact that it’s taking this long for the outstanding issues to be implemented. What will happen to the GNU if Mr. Mugabe refuses to implement the outstanding issues? The MDC-T’s strategy is further complicated by reports indicating that the majority of their members have stated that the MDC-T should remain and fight Zanu PF from within the GNU. Will the MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai be able to threaten Zanu PF with another disengagement from the GNU?
The MDC finds itself caught between a rock and hard place. According to the MDC-T the majority of the party members at grass root levels have decided that the MDC-T should remain in the GNU and to fight Zanu PF from within the government of national unity. While some might quickly suggest that it is pointless to remain in the GNU because the MDC-T has no real power we must appreciate that these members of our society are the backbone of the MDC-T and have experienced the worst brunt of violence unleashed by the Zanu PF militia and army during Zimbabwe’s March 2008 presidential elections. On the other hand the GNU has resulted in the dollarization and availability of basic food stuffs. The return of this some what social stability is much better than the lack of basic food stuffs and the running battles with Zanu PF militia that the MDC supporters had grown accustomed before the GNU.
A complete withdrawal from the GNU will also mean that the MDC-T will relinquish the strategic ministry of finance. Without the checks and balances that finance minister Tendai Biti is attempting to put in place Zanu PF will go back to their wayward ways and may even bring back the worthless Zimbabwe dollar.
If anything there are two distinct strategic points of references for the MDC-T leadership and the ordinary members of the party. The key is developing an effective strategy mix that meets the needs and accommodates both sides. The problem is that the MDC-T strategy is no longer clear, not being effectively communicated by the MDC-T leadership as evident from the results of the MDC-T rally feed backs. There is too much inconsistency from the MDC-T.
Going forward the MDC-T must ensure that each aspect of their strategy mix resonates well and meets the needs of the citizens of Zimbabwe, party members and leadership of the MDC-T. There seems to be a problem within the MDC-T in terms of understanding the needs of their ordinary members and implementing those insights as part of their strategy so that when decisions are made the strategy is understood and resonates with the members.
MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai decided to revert to the GNU without Mr. Mugabe meeting his demands to implement the outstanding GNU issues. What will happen in 30 days if Mr. Mugabe does not resolve the outstanding GNU issues? It would have been a more effective and credible strategy if the MDC-T ensured a consistent performance on the demands to implement the outstanding issues before reverting to the GNU without any of the demands being met by Mr. Mugabe.
Furthermore, the power sharing agreement has diluted some of the most effective strategies that the MDC-T was relying on to obtain political control from Mr. Mugabe. ARTICLE 4.6 (a) and (b) of the power sharing agreement calls for all parties to agree to the removal of economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe without Mr. Mugabe having to fulfill the terms of the entire power sharing agreement as a condition of lifting the economic sanctions. It leaves the MDC-T with no leverage, but the hope that Mr. Mugabe will honor the agreement. So far Mr. Mugabe and his cronies have continued to violate the terms of the power sharing agreement through violent attacks, unwarranted arrests of officials from the MDC-T and a total disregard for the law.
Another strategic blow to the MDC-T contained in the power sharing agreement is ARTICLE 9.2 (C) which states that no outsiders shall have a right to call or campaign for regime change in Zimbabwe. In other words the MDC-T can not seek assistance from the international community to legally remove Mr. Mugabe from office. Thus any effective campaign by the international community calling for Mr. Mugabe to step down is a violation of the power sharing agreement.
Under ARTICLE 19 the power sharing agreement states that there are further concerns that foreign government funded external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe “are not in Zimbabwe’s national interest”. Really? ARTICLE 19.1 (I) in part calls upon the governments that are hosting and /or funding external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to cease such hosting and funding. Foreign based radio stations are essential in broadcasting the MDC-T’s political platform, debunking the Zanu PF propaganda and the MDC-T can not win any major political support without the use of external radio stations that broadcast into Zimbabwe because Zanu PF has a monopoly on the Zimbabwe broadcasting corporation (ZBC-state radio station) and it is dedicated to broadcasting Zanu PF’s skewed political views. Zanu PF will never allow the MDC-T to have equal radio time on the state funded radio station.
The first rule of the MDC-T’s new strategy must be do what you say especially for short term demands such as implementing already agreed upon outstanding GNU issues. However, the strategy can only be effective if it resonates well with the majority members. What would have happened if the MDC-T had completely pulled out of the GNU only to find out from the feed back rallies that their members wanted the leadership to remain within the GNU? For major decisions the MDC-T leadership needs to secure permission from their members because the MDC-T national council and ordinary members are functioning at two different strategic frames of reference. They will view the issues differently depending on their needs and situations.
There is a need for the MDC-T leadership to have an effective relationship with its members and that can only be established by knowing and understanding well in advance the needs and wants of the ordinary members. The MDC-T will only grow if the strategies do not contradict the political, economic and social interests of their members. It will be essential for the national organizing secretary Mr. Morgan Komichi and the secretary for Information and publicity Mr. Nelson Chamisa to establish an effective strategy that ensures that the strategies being implemented are well defined, communicated, understood and meet the needs of the grass root structures.
At this point the MDC-T needs to clearly articulate its strategy, whatever it is. It is becoming more confusing as the MDC-T continues to behave as if the GNU is a permanent fixture instead of maintaining the emphasis on legally removing Mr. Mugabe from office. That is the goal and that is still the focus. While we all appreciate that they are attempting by all efforts to be hopeful about this vile political ménage a trios. At the end of the day Zanu PF is Zanu PF and the MDC-T is the MDC-T. The MDC-T leadership must continue to find avenues that will see Zimbabwe being politically controlled by the MDC-T.
There is less emphasis on this issue from the MDC-T and more focus on the GNU which is only a temporary structure. As much as the implementation of the outstanding issues is important there is no need to put all the eggs in one basket. The focus and goal is still the same. MUGABE MUST GO!!!!!! The MDC-T leadership must go back to the drawing board in partnership with their grass roots structures, civic society, business leaders and create a strategy that addresses the hot buttons and meets the needs of all players. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure consistent communication, performance analysis and repositioning of the strategy to be effective, but the prerequisite is for citizens to be included in establishing the strategy, knowing, understanding what the strategy is and how the strategy will be implemented, modified and lastly there must be measurable variables to gauge the effectiveness of the strategy.
The power sharing agreement does also cause some problems for Zapu in the sense that it is now a violation of the power sharing agreement to obtain political control through military means. ARTICLE 9.2 (B) indirectly takes aim at Zapu. It states in part to reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of changing governments. Zanu PF was clearly being proactive given Zapu’s military capability and the advance stages of revamping the political organization. The MDC-T should also have insisted that the article include the following:
To reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of maintaining governments after being defeated through legitimate elections or any other constitutional means.
Clearly the MDC-T leadership is still maintaining a secretive approach to their strategy. The net effect of this is that it creates confusion in the minds of all concerned rather than forge strong support. Unfortunately this time they had banked on disengagement from the GNU as a strategy in direct contradiction with their grass roots structures. There is a need for the MDC-T to perform a SWOT analysis of their current strategy and create a new strategy given the new hurdles of the current power sharing agreement.
In my opinion if the MDC-T had engaged in full consultations with civic groups prior to signing the power sharing agreement they would have advised the MDC-T not to sign the agreement given that the agreement dilutes the MDC-T’s most effective strategies in favor of a guarantee from SADC which does not stipulate how the agreement will be enforced if any of the principals breach the terms of the power sharing agreement. SADC’s request to have the governor of the reserve bank of Zimbabwe Gideon Gono replaced will be a sure test of how the organization intends to enforce the agreement if Mr. Mugabe does not comply with their request.
It is s really important for the MDC-T is to partner with civic groups, business leaders and seek avenues that will weaken Zanu PF’s financial, political power and obtain control of essential institutions that are critical in reforming Zimbabwe. The starting point is identifying institutions that finance Zanu PF’s machinery and encourage their members to financially boycott such organizations. MDC-T members can not continue to financially invest in organizations that finance Zanu PF and make it possible for Mr. Mugabe to conduct his terror campaigns nor continue to support businesses owned by individuals who finance Mr. Mugabe.
The MDC must also insist that SADC stipulates how they will enforce the agreement if any of the principals to the agreement does not conform to the power sharing agreement. There needs to be options to holding early elections under the supervision of SADC if the principals are unable to make the power sharing agreement work since Mr. Mugabe is in favor of an Afro centric solution to the crisis. On the other hand SADC’s credibility is at stake and needs to grow a pair and demonstrate to the world and Africa in particular that is more than capable of resolving its own issues. Only then can we as Africans have confidence in the organization.
